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Commercial integration in the Mercosur area has increased substantially in the last few years and
it is expected to continue to grow rapidly in the near future. However, given the historical record
of policy management in the region, especially in Brazil and Argentina, the main partners of this
integration initiative, it is not clear whether macroeconomic policies will provide the required
conditions of sustainability for such a rapid trade expansion. This paper discusses the relationship
between macroeconomic coordination and commercial integration in the context of Mercosur.
After examining the impact of policy instability on trade flows within the region in recent years, it
evaluates the prospects for closer coordination of macroeconomic policies in the future.
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Commercial integration in the Mercosur area has increased substantially in recent years. While
extra-Mercosur exports grew by an annual average rate of about 6 percent from 1990 to 1996,
intra-Mercosur exports went up by some 26 percent a year in the same period. Such a remarkable
trade expansion took place during a time of marked differences in the implementation of
macroeconomic policies in Argentina and Brazil, by far the largest economies in the region.
With a deepening of the integration process expected to take place in the near future, as Mercosur
consolidates its move towards a true common market, questions arise on whether macroeconomic
policies in member countries will provide the required stability for a further expansion in regional
trade flows.
Excessive price and exchange rate fluctuations, which arise in response to uncoordinated
macroeconomic policies, impact international trade through at least two major channels. In
addition to stimulate lobbying for protection in import competing sectors, price and exchange rate
variability induce domestic producers to refrain from exporting, allocating resources differently
than what would be suggested by comparative advantage.
This paper discusses the relationship between macroeconomic coordination and commercial
integration in the context of Mercosur. After examining the impact of policy instability on trade
flows within the region in recent years, it evaluates the prospects for closer coordination of
macroeconomic policies in the future.
The next section discusses the link between macroeconomic policies, real exchange rate
movements and international trade. Section 3 examines how differences in the implementation of
macroeconomic policies have caused strains within Mercosur in recent years, leading to successful
lobbying behavior by import competing sectors. In Section 4, the relationship between real
exchange rate variability and export flows in Mercosur is examined empirically. Section 5
concludes with an assessment of the prospects for macroeconomic coordination within the region.3
2. MACROECONOMIC COORDINATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
In recent years, considerable progress has been achieved in integration initiatives in different
regions of the world. The available evidence reveals that successful initiatives have taken place
both in regions with relative macroeconomic stability among countries, and in regions where
countries have marked differences in their macroeconomic stands. Thus, while commodity and
factor market integration has advanced in the European Union in the context of explicit
convergence indicators for macroeconomic policies, within Mercosur, for example, commercial
integration has proceeded amid periods of pronounced macroeconomic instability in some of its
member countries.
1
A fundamental link between macroeconomic coordination and trade integration takes place via the
exchange rate. Differences in the implementation of monetary and fiscal policies across countries
may cause excessive variability in real exchange rates 
2, impacting international trade through at
least two major channels. In addition to stimulate lobbying for protection in import competing
sectors, price and exchange rate variability induce domestic producers to allocate resources
differently than what would be suggested by comparative advantage. In both cases, what results is
a level of international trade - and economic welfare - lower than what would prevail under
coordinated macroeconomic policies.
If there is a high degree of interdependence among countries, the effects of real exchange rate
variability can be of a significant order of magnitude. Integration, therefore, imposes the need for
more coordinated macroeconomic policies. This section examines the empirical evidence on the
link between macroeconomic coordination and international trade. It starts by briefly reviewing
the relationship between macroeconomic related instability and real exchange rate movements,
and then concentrates on the impact of real exchange rate fluctuations on international trade.
                                                       
1 For a review of experiences of macroeconomic coordination in different integration contexts, see Abreu and
Bevilaqua (1995).4
2.1 Policy Instability and Real Exchange Rates
The link between instability generated by uncoordinated macroeconomic policies and real
exchange rate variability has been examined in a series of empirical studies. De Grauwe and
Rosiers (1987), for example, look at a sample of developed and developing countries and find that
monetary instability is a major factor determining the variability of real exchange rates.
In an early analysis using a sample formed only by developing countries, Edwards (1987) finds
that both nominal and real disturbances are important determinants of the variability in real
exchange rates. Edwards’ results have been extended in a recent update of his study. Using data
for 30 developing countries during the 1979-1993 period, Eichengreen (1997) presents evidence
consistent with the view that economic structure and policy are important determinants of real
exchange rate volatility.
In addition to looking at the impact of policy variability on exchange rates, Eichengreen makes an
effort to evaluate how economic integration alters the nature of this link. His results provide some
evidence that both the variability of domestic credit growth and the volatility of  real GDP growth
have a stronger impact on the variability of the real exchange rate in more open economies.
2.2 Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations and International Trade
Two effects of real exchange rate fluctuations on international trade have been examined in the
literature. The first effect refers to the indirect, but significant, impact of exchange rate
movements on trade volumes. For a given level of protection, prolonged real exchange
movements induced by different macroeconomic policy stances usually increase import
penetration. A variety of models of political economy of trade policy predict that, in response to
increased import competition, domestic producers intensify protectionist pressures and normally
                                                                                                                                                                                  
2 In pegged exchange rate regimes this will be the major concern.  With floating exchange rates, variability on
nominal exchange rates will also be an issue.5
succeed in causing trade volumes to decrease.
3 Because of the well known contrasts between the
lobbying power of producers and consumers, once protection is increased, it is not easy to reduce
it, even if  the misalignment in the real exchange rate between trade partners is reverted. Given
this asymmetry, the impact of misalignment on trade is likely to be reinforced. Each round of a
misalignment cycle between trade partners may result in increased protection and, therefore,
reduced trade levels.
Using 1983 U.S. manufacturing data, Trefler (1993) presents evidence consistent with the view
that a rise in import penetration leads to greater protection. Estimating the impact on U.S. imports
of the elimination of all nontariff barriers to trade (NTBs) in manufacturing with simultaneous
equations for imports and NTBs, he finds that the increase in import penetration has the expected
positive sign and is statistically significant.
Rather than taking into consideration the endogenous determination of imports and protection in
the econometric specifications, but still exploring the political economy effect of exchange rate
variability, other empirical studies have tried to assess directly the link between prolonged real
exchange rate movements and the level of trade. In general, the empirical evidence fails to reject
the hypothesis that long swings in real exchange rates, or exchange rate misalignments, affects
trade adversely.
De Grauwe (1988), for example, uses cross section export equations to assess if real exchange
rate variability has a negative effect on the growth rate of trade. The variability of the real
exchange rate is less important than reduced output growth or the decreased pace of both
integration in the EC and Japanese penetration of industrial markets to explain the fall in trade
growth among industrial countries from 1960-1969 to 1973-1984. But it still accounts for no less
than 20% of the total effect.
                                                       
3 The theory of endogenous protection views the level of protection as determined by the equilibrium between the
demand for protection by interest groups and the supply of protection by politicians. See Rodrik (1995) for a review
of recent contributions on the political economy of trade policy.6
Similarly, Sapir, Sekkat and Weber (1994) find that trade flows between countries in the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) and non-ERM
countries are especially sensitive to exchange rate misalignments. However, they find no
significant impact for intra-ERM trade flows. This evidence is interpreted by the authors as
strongly supporting the view that the ERM has succeeded in greatly reducing misalignments and
has helped European countries to avoid protectionist pressures.
The second effect of real exchange rate fluctuations on international trade examined in the
literature refers to the direct impact of real exchange rate induced uncertainty on trade. Assuming
risk-averse economic agents, the risk associated with exchange rate volatility will lead agents to
relocate to domestic activities and, as a result, will produce lower trade volumes.
4 There have
been many studies of the effect of exchange rate volatility both on aggregate and on bilateral trade
flows.
5 However, no clear evidence of a significant and systematic effect of exchange rate
volatility on trade flows has emerged from this literature.
In a recent study for a sample of ten developing countries, Grobar (1993) explores the link
between manufactured exports and real exchange rate uncertainty. Export supply equations are
estimated for four Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) categories of manufactures,
using pooled data for in the period 1963-1985, with four indices of real exchange rate uncertainty
being considered. The results show a significant negative effect of real exchange rate uncertainty
for two of the four categories (Chemicals and Machinery), regardless of which uncertainty index
is used in the estimation. For the other two categories, the results are not conclusive. In one case
(Miscellaneous manufactures) the coefficient on the uncertainty variable is negative in all
specifications, but its significance depends on which index is used; in the other (Manufactures),
real exchange rate uncertainty does not have a significant effect on exports. 
                                                       
4 This result depends on a utility function with absolute risk aversion.  For more general specifications there could
be ambiguity on the effect of risk on trade.  See De Grauwe (1988) for a model in which higher exchange rate risk
may result in greater export activity.
5 The early literature is surveyed in IMF (1984).  Recent studies are reviewed in Sapir, Sekkat and  Weber (1994),
and Côté (1994).7
Eichengreen and Irwin (1993), and Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), among others, have assessed the
impact of exchange rate variability on trade flows using the gravity model of  Linneman (1966), which
relates bilateral trade flows to national income, population, geographical distance between countries,
and contiguity. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) examined  the impact of both nominal and real
exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade flows, using a sample of  63 countries with separate
cross-section equations for 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990. The standard gravity model
was augmented by dummy variables to capture the effect of trade initiatives and a measure of
exchange rate volatility. In general, the results fail to display a systematic effect of volatility on
bilateral trade and when the coefficients in the estimated equations have the expected negative
impact, their magnitude is small.
Similar evidence is obtained by Abreu and Bevilaqua (1995) using the standard gravity framework
in the context of Mercosur. Given the small number of countries in the integration initiative, the
standard gravity analysis was framed within a fixed effects model, with data for the period 1958-
1994. A dummy variable for the years after 1991, when the Asuncion Treaty was signed, indicates
that countries in the region have traded more with one another as a result of Mercosur.
6 When a
measure of real exchange rate variability is added to the basic specifications, however, its
estimated coefficient has the expected sign but is not significantly different from zero at standard
confidence levels.
A potential explanation for the fact that a significant and systematic effect of exchange rate
uncertainty on trade flows has not emerged from the literature is that low cost hedging
instruments against exchange rate risk became increasingly available in recent years, and their use
reduces the impact of volatility on trade flows.
7  
                                                       
6 This result is consistent with those obtained by Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), which indicate that Mercosur
trade is far greater than what would be explained by gravity alone. They find a strong intraregional trade bias
which increased in recent years: in 1985 trade was twice what would be explained by gravity; in 1990 the ratio had
risen to eight.
7 Bini-Smaghi (1991), however, argues that no systematic relationship is found because empirical analyses of the
impact of exchange rate variability on trade flows have a series of methodological problems that may lead to
imprecise statistical results.  Estimating the relationship with intra-EMS trade data for the period 1976-1984 he
finds significant evidence of a negative relationship.8
3. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND TRADE STRAINS IN MERCOSUR 
8
The "Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR)" was established on March 26, 1991, when the
Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion. It was preceded
by the Integration, Co-operation and Development Treaty of August 1989 between Argentina and
Brazil, which followed the Iguazú Declaration of November 1985.
A common market among the four countries came into force on January 1, 1995, with a Common
External Tariff (CET) ranging from zero to 20 percent. The CET applies to about 85 percent of total
trade and a list of temporary exemptions affects 300 items in each country (399 for Paraguay). Tariffs
will converge to a common Mercosur level by 2001. Capital goods and computer industry goods are
exempted from the CET but tariffs will converge by 2006. Trade within Mercosur is free of tariffs but
there is a small list of exemptions which is scheduled to be phased out until the year 2000.
Commercial integration in the Mercosur area has increased substantially in the last few years. Total
Mercosur exports grew from US$46 billions in 1990 to US$75 billions in 1996, with the share of intra-
Mercosur exports increasing  from 9 percent to 22 percent. An even more impressive change occurred
in the region’s total imports, which increased from US$29 billions in 1990 to US$89 billions in 1996,
with the share of intra-Mercosur imports growing from 14 percent to 21 percent (Table 3.1).
The increase in the relative importance of regional trade has been different for the four countries. In
1990 about 15 percent of Argentina’s exports went to Mercosur countries, yet this share went up to 33
percent in 1996. For Brazil, although the 1990 level was lower (about 4 percent), the Mercosur share
of its exports increased by almost four times (to 15 percent in 1996). For Paraguay and Uruguay, the
increases in the Mercosur share in total trade were less dramatic, but in both cases the level of total
exports to Mercosur countries almost doubled between 1990 and 1996 (Tables 3.2 to 3.5).
                                                       
8 Portions of this section draw on Abreu and Bevilaqua (1995).Table 3.1
Mercosur: External Trade, 1990-1996
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996* Average Growth
Rate 1990-1996
Exports
Total (US$ Millions) 46456 45920 51557 54304 62885 68509 75030 8%
Intra-Mercosur 9% 11% 14% 19% 19% 18% 22% 26%
Extra-Mercosur 91% 89% 86% 81% 81% 82% 78% 6%
Imports
Total (US$ Millions) 29295 34341 38663 48763 60873 75873 89213.8 20%
Intra-Mercosur 14% 15% 19% 19% 20% 17% 21% 28%
Extra-Mercosur 86% 85% 81% 81% 80% 83% 79% 19%
* Estimated
Source:  IMF. Directions of Trade Statistics. Yearbook. 1996Table 3.2
Mercosur: Bilateral Exports, 1990-1996
(US$ millions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Aver. Growth
Rate 1990-1996
Argentina 1833 1978 2327 3684 4803 6778 7925 28%
Brazil 1423 1489 1671 2814 3655 5484 6615 29%
Paraguay 147 178 272 358 498 631 584 26%
Uruguay 263 311 384 512 650 663 726 18%
Brazil 1320 2309 4097 5397 5922 6154 7306 33%
Argentina 645 1476 3040 3661 4136 4041 5170 41%
Paraguay 380 496 543 961 1054 1301 1325 23%
Uruguay 295 337 514 775 732 812 811 18%
Paraguay 379 259 246 287 425 509 737 12%
Argentina 55 45 64 65 91 80 141 17%
Brazil 312 203 171 215 324 399 567 10%
Uruguay 12 11 11 7 10 30 29 16%
Uruguay 594 557 544 698 898 995 1153 12%
Argentina 82 163 250 316 382 268 272 22%
Brazil 506 384 284 366 492 702 831 9%
Paraguay 6 10 10 16 24 25 50 42%
Source:  IMF. Directions of Trade Statistics. Yearbook. 1996
Table 3.3
Mercosur: Share of Intra-Mercosur Exports in Total Exports, 1990-1996
(%)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Argentina 15% 17% 19% 28% 29% 32% 33%
Brazil 12% 12% 14% 21% 22% 26% 28%
Paraguay 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2%
Uruguay 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3%
Brazil 4% 7% 11% 14% 14% 13% 15%
Argentina 2% 5% 8% 9% 9% 9% 11%
Paraguay 1% 2% 1% 2% 2% 3% 3%
Uruguay 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Paraguay 40% 35% 37% 40% 52% 43% 57%
Argentina 6% 6% 10% 9% 11% 7% 11%
Brazil 33% 28% 26% 30% 40% 34% 44%
Uruguay 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 3% 2%
Uruguay 34% 35% 34% 42% 47% 47% 48%
Argentina 5% 10% 15% 19% 20% 13% 11%
Brazil 29% 24% 18% 22% 26% 33% 35%
Paraguay 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2%
Source:  IMF. Directions of Trade Statistics. Yearbook. 1996Table 3.4
Mercosur: Bilateral Imports, 1990-1996
(US$ millions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Aver. Growth
Rate 1990-1996
Argentina 876 1738 3755 4212 5147 4603 5809 37%
Brazil 718 1532 3339 3568 4286 4176 5327 40%
Paraguay 42 40 65 73 72 140 182 28%
Uruguay 116 166 351 571 789 287 300 17%
Brazil 2443 2416 2249 3524 4583 6821 9083 24%
Argentina 1514 1747 1721 2809 3662 5570 7452 30%
Paraguay 335 223 187 275 352 514 606 10%
Uruguay 594 446 341 440 569 737 1025 10%
Paraguay 367 396 475 570 892 1170 1582 28%
Argentina 151 152 201 211 308 491 485 21%
Brazil 207 234 263 340 555 645 1045 31%
Uruguay 9 10 11 19 29 34 52 34%
Uruguay 540 656 832 1127 1371 1322 1462 18%
Argentina 222 272 346 479 653 609 691 21%
Brazil 303 373 475 641 709 699 746 16%
Paraguay 15 11 11 7 9 14 25 9%
Source:  IMF. Directions of Trade Statistics. Yearbook. 1996
Table 3.5
Mercosur: Share of Intra-Mercosur Imports in Total Exports, 1990-1996
(%)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Argentina 21% 21% 25% 25% 23% 23% 24%
Brazil 18% 18% 22% 21% 19% 21% 22%
Paraguay 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
Uruguay 3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 1% 1%
Brazil 11% 10% 11% 13% 14% 14% 15%
Argentina 7% 8% 8% 10% 11% 11% 13%
Paraguay 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Uruguay 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2%
Paraguay 31% 31% 38% 39% 42% 42% 49%
Argentina 13% 12% 16% 14% 14% 18% 15%
Brazil 17% 18% 21% 23% 26% 23% 32%
Uruguay 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2%
Uruguay 41% 42% 41% 48% 49% 46% 44%
Argentina 17% 18% 17% 20% 23% 21% 21%
Brazil 23% 24% 24% 27% 25% 24% 22%
Paraguay 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Source:  IMF. Directions of Trade Statistics. Yearbook. 199611
Mercosur removed barriers that had long restrained trade among countries in the region. It is,
therefore, expected that trade integration will continue to increase in the near future as Mercosur
consolidates its move towards a true common market. However, part of the trade expansion that took
place in recent years can be attributed to the effects of very different macroeconomic policy stances in
Argentina and Brazil, the major partners in the region. And, as discussed in the previous section, rapid
import growth in response to misaligned real exchange rates may encourage protectionist pressures and
end up leading to reduced trade volumes. This section examines the role of uncoordinated
macroeconomic policies in causing trade strains and fueling protectionism within Mercosur in recent
years. It starts by briefly examining the recent record of macroeconomic policies in Argentina and
Brazil, and then discusses trade strains in response to increased import penetration. 
3.1 Recent Macroeconomic Developments in Argentina and Brazil
Mercosur’s better than expected performance in the first half of the 1990s owns a lot to economic
reforms in Argentina and Brazil. Both countries had virtually no economic growth and extremely high
inflation rates back in 1990. During that year, real GDP increased by only 0.1 percent in Argentina and
shrank by 4.6 percent in Brazil. As for the inflation rate, it reached in 1990 about 1,344 percent in
Argentina and 1,658 percent in Brazil (see Table 3.6 for macroeconomic data on Mercosur countries).
During the transition period to the launching of Mercosur, both countries liberalized their external
sector and undertook significant efforts to reach macroeconomic stability. In the two cases, the
reduction in tariffs was an important tool to achieve price stability, by exposing local producers to the
competition of less expensive imports.
Since the introduction of the Convertibility Plan, by Domingo Cavallo in 1991, Argentina’s peso is
fixed by law at par with the US dollar.  From the standpoint of stabilization and economic growth, the
plan has been an outstanding success. The inflation rate went down to less than 1 percent a year in
1996. Real GDP grew at annual average rates of over 7 percent between 1991 and 1994.  In 1995
Argentina was hit hard by the by the effects of the December 1994 Mexican crisis.  Under Argentina’s
commitment to a fixed parity, the money supply is tightly linked to the level of foreign exchangeTABLE 3.6
Mercosur: Macroeconomic Data, 1990 - 1996
(In percent)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Real GDP Growth Rate
Argentina 0.1 10.5 10.3 6.3 8.5 -4.6 4.3
Brazil -4.6 0.3 -0.8 4.2 5.8 5.4 2.9
Paraguay 3.1 2.5 1.8 4.1 3.1 4.7 1.3
Uruguay 0.9 3.2 7.9 3.0 6.3 -2.0 4.9
Inflation Rate (CPI)
Argentina 1343.9 84.0 17.6 7.3 3.9 1.7 0.1
Brazil 1657.7 493.8 1156.4 2828.7 1258.6 25.3 11.3
Paraguay 44.1 11.8 17.8 20.4 18.3 10.6 8.2
Uruguay 129.0 81.5 58.9 52.9 44.1 36.8 24.3
Source: IMF. International Financial Statistics. Yearbook. 199613
reserves. So, when reserves shrank in 1995 in response to the Mexican crisis, money supply contracted
too and real GDP went down by 4.6 percent. With improved international conditions in 1996,
economic growth reached 4.3 percent. For 1997, real GDP is expected to increase at rates comparable
with the record rates of 1991-1994.
Brazil’s recent history of macroeconomic management has some similarities with Argentina’s. The Real
Plan preparatory stages were launched in late 1993, but the new currency was introduced only on July
1, 1994.  Even if less dramatic than in Argentina, price stability has been spectacular. Monthly inflation
rates have been brought down from more than 40 percent to under 1 percent on a sustained basis. In
1997, for the first time in decades, the annual inflation rate is expected to have only a single digit.
Economic growth also has been sustained. In 1993, after three years of recession, Brazilian GDP grew
by more than 4 percent. The recovery accelerated from mid-1994 with the introduction of the final
stage of the stabilization plan.  In both 1994 and 1995, economic growth exceeded 5 percent, reaching
a peak in the first quarter of 1995 at a growth rate of more than 10 percent over the same quarter a
year earlier. That coincided with the outbreak of the Mexican crisis and the government decided to
increase interest rates sharply to cool the overheated economy and control the deterioration in the trade
balance which, for the first time in years, had become negative in November of 1994. As intended, the
activity level reacted to the tightening of monetary policy and the rate of growth of real GDP declined
to 2.9 percent in 1996. Current projections put the 1997 economic growth rate at about 3.5 percent.
3.2 Exchange Rate Misalignment and Trade Strains
Bilateral trade developments between Argentina and Brazil during the period 1991-1996 were mostly
determined by the marked differences in macroeconomic policies in the two countries. In both cases,
policy tools were used primarily for the goal of price stability. Trade integration was not an issue
directing  macroeconomic implementation. 
From 1991 to mid 1994, the peso-real parity was largely favorable to Brazil (see Figure 3.1).
Argentina’s currency remained pegged to the US dollar, while the Brazilian currency continued to be14
adjusted in line with the accelerating inflation rate. Also, the end of hyperinflation in Argentina
triggered a strong consumer boom and economic growth was much higher than in Brazil. As a result,
between 1991 and 1994 Argentina's imports from Brazil increased at an annual average rate of 56
percent. Meanwhile, Brazil's imports from Argentina grew at about 25 percent a year.
The circumstances changed substantially during 1995-1996 with the nominal appreciation and the
consumer boom which followed the introduction of the new currency in Brazil in July 1994, while
Argentina was struggling with the effects of the Mexican crisis. Argentina's imports from Brazil went
up by only 12 percent a year during these two years. The rate of growth of Brazil's imports from
Argentina, in turn, was almost four times higher (46 percent a year). The bilateral trade balance, which
had been traditionally unfavorable to Argentina and had further deteriorated with the Convertibility
Plan, was reversed in September 1994.
Those marked swings in the pattern of trade between the two countries (see Figure 3.2) naturally
generated some serious strains. With the trade balance with Brazil changing from a surplus of US$705
millions in 1990 to a deficit of US$754 millions in 1993, Argentina's government resorted from
October 1992 to a series of protectionist measures. The “statistical tax” levied on imports, including
those from Mercosur, was increased from 3 to 10 percent and anti-dumping measures and safeguard
actions were implemented to protect the domestic industry from import competition. Also, in 1993
Brazil agreed to buy wheat and petroleum from Argentina in order to help alleviate the bilateral trade
deficit and relieve internal criticisms to the integration process in Argentina.
Similarly, in response to a deterioration on its trade balance, the Brazilian government decided in early
1995 to introduce tariff increases, import quotas and restrictions on import credit affecting selected
products, especially consumer durables, in a partial reversal of the monotonic trade liberalization policy
which had been maintained since 1990. Tariffs on vehicle imports were raised from 20 to 32 percent in
February 1995 and to 70 percent two months later.
9 Soon after, quotas were introduced to help reduce
vehicle imports by 50 percent in the second half of the year.
                                                       
9 Tariffs were reduced to 63 percent in 1997 and is due to be reduced to 49 percent in 1998, 35 percent in 1999, and to be
brought under the CET falling to 20 percent in the year 200015
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By then, Brazil had become the biggest market for Argentina's vehicle exports. When the initial
statements by the Brazilian authorities underlined that the restrictions would also apply to imports from
Mercosur, there was a strong reaction by the Argentinean authorities.  After a diplomatic row which
lasted several months, in January 1996 the countries reached a bilateral agreement setting a policy for
the motor industry. Under the deal, which replaces free trade with a form of managed trade, Brazil
exempted Mercosur-made cars (mainly from Argentina) from the tariff increase, but until the year 2000
firms with plants in both countries must have a balanced bilateral trade of cars and components. Firms
with plants only in Argentina have a quota for exports to Brazil at half the going tariff. The agreement
is intended to run until the year 2000, when free trade is due to prevail within Mercosur.
In early April 1997, the concern with a possible deterioration in the trade balance led the Brazilian
authorities to undertake measures that increased anxiety within Mercosur yet one more time.
Restrictions to the local financing of imports were introduced and prompted a strong reaction
from Argentina’s authorities. After a few days of diplomatic squabble, Brazilian authorities
decided to exempt imports from Mercosur from the new restrictions for a period of 120 days.
10
Having recent developments in Mercosur as a background, the analysis in this section indicates
that swift increases in import penetration in response to very different macroeconomic policy
stances may result in increased protectionism. As there is no indication that protectionist measures
taken when currencies were overvalued were reversed when the same currencies became
undervalued, Mercosur strains illustrate forcefully the vulnerability of integration initiatives to the
political economy effect of real exchange rate variability.
                                                       
10 In order to avoid new conflicts, Argentina and Brazil decided to start the activities of the Mercosur’s sub-group
on Economic Coordination, introduced by the Ouro Preto agreements which created the customs union in 1994,
which had been dormant until April 1997.  In the future, member governments will exchange information about
the economic conditions in their countries and about important decisions to be implemented.17
4. EXCHANGE RATE VARIABILITY AND TRADE FLOWS IN MERCOSUR
As discussed before, in addition to its indirect impact through increased protectionism, real exchange
rate fluctuations can have a direct impact on international trade.  By increasing the risk associated with
export activities, real exchange rate variability can cause the volume of international trade to decline. 
The empirical importance of this effect for intra-Mercosur trade is examined in this section.
Real exchange rate volatility has dropped significantly during the Mercosur period. According to the
data presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, for most of the bilateral real exchange rates in the region the mean
and the standard deviation of volatility have decreased from 1985-1990 to 1991-1996. The timing of
the reduction in the volatility of most bilateral rates in the Mercosur period can be associated with the
stabilization plans of Argentina and Brazil.
What has been the impact of such exchange rate variability on intra-Mercosur trade?  This question is
now assessed with the use of standard export supply equations with bilateral trade data for the four
countries in the region. In the basic export supply equation, the log of real bilateral export flows is
assumed to be a function of the log of the bilateral real exchange rate (RER) and the log of the real
gross domestic product in the trade partner (GDP). A fixed effects model is used which allows for
different intercepts for the bilateral export flows and accounts for specific effects on export
performance, such as trade regime, tax policy and credit policy. Quarterly data was gathered for the
period 1985I-1996II, yielding a total of 552 bilateral trade flows. The basic equation is augmented in
some specifications by a standard measure of exchange rate volatility: the standard deviation of the first
difference of the logarithmic bilateral real exchange rate, with the quarterly standard deviation being
taken over the two years preceding the export flows.
The estimation results are shown in Table 4.3. All specifications include country-pair specific intercepts
and year dummies which are not presented in the table. Equation 1 displays the results for the basic
export supply equation. Both the real exchange rate and activity variables are statistically different from
zero at very high confidence levels and have their expected signs: a real depreciation or an increase in18
Table 4.1
Mercosur: Mean of  Bilateral
Real Exchange Rate Volatility, 1985-1996
Years
1985-1990 1991-1996
Argentina - Brasil 0.0529 0.0176
Argentina - Paraguay 0.0722 0.0106
Argentina - Uruguay 0.0528 0.0122
Brasil - Paraguay 0.0443 0.0128
Brasil - Uruguay 0.0187 0.0131
Paraguay - Uruguay 0.0408 0.0072
Note. Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the monthly difference of the
logarthmic bilateral exchange rate within a year.
Bilateral Real Exchange Rate calculated with Countrie's Consumer Prices.
Source: Authors' calculation with data from IMF, International Financial Statistics
Table 4.2
Mercosur: Standard Deviation of Bilateral
Real Exchange Rate Volatility, 1985-1996
Years
1985-1990 1991-1996
Argentina - Brasil 0.0188 0.0053
Argentina - Paraguay 0.0255 0.0032
Argentina - Uruguay 0.0192 0.0037
Brasil - Paraguay 0.0155 0.0038
Brasil - Uruguay 0.0035 0.0039
Paraguay - Uruguay 0.0162 0.0011
                           Source and definitions: see Table 4.119
Table 4.3
Mercosur: Determinants of Bilateral Exports, 1985I-1996II
Restricted Model Estimates
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
RER 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
(4.57) (4.57) (4.57) (4.57)
GDP 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.50
(2.99) (2.99) (2.72) (2.72)
MERC - 1.49 - 1.46
(11.91) (11.62)
VOL - -  -1.12  -1.12
(-1.33) (-1.33)
Adj. R
2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
# of obs. 552 552 552 552
Std. Error 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Log-likelihood  -318.19  -318.19  -317.26  -317.26
t-statistics in parenthesis
Data sources: IMF: International Finantial Statististics CD-ROM 03/97
                       IMF: Directions of Trade Statistics20
the activity level in the trade partner increase a country's exports. The basic specification is augmented
with a dummy variable for Mercosur (MERC) in Equation 2. This variable takes the value of one from
1991 on and its estimated coefficient confirms that trade in the region has increased after the Asunción
Treaty was signed. Equations 3 and 4 add the real exchange rate volatility measure (VOL) to the basic
specification. The estimated coefficient has the expected sign, but is not significantly different from zero
at standard confidence levels.
The four specifications in Table 4.3 constrain the slope coefficients to be the same throughout the
entire estimation period. For that reason, the results may not be capturing the contribution of the
decreased real exchange rate volatility for the expansion of intra-Mercosur trade after 1991. Table 4.4
presents estimation results obtained with an unrestricted version of the basic export supply. Again, all
specifications include country-pair specific intercepts and year dummies (not presented in the table).
The first specification shows that when real exchange rate and activity variables are allowed to have
different coefficients before and after 1991, both have a stronger and significant impact on trade flows
during the more recent period. This result remains the same when a Mercosur dummy is added to the
basic specification in the second column of Table 4.4, showing that the 1991-1996 coefficients on the
two explanatory variables are not simply picking up other Mercosur related effects. The last two
equations in the table add the volatility measure to the unrestricted model specifications. The results
show that real exchange rate volatility has had a small but significant negative impact on trade flows
during the Mercosur period, with an implied elasticity of -0.06 for the last specification in Table 4.4.
For the earlier period, the coefficient on the volatility measure has the expected negative sign, but is not
accurately estimated. Likelihood ratio tests reject at standard confidence levels the hypothesis that the
coefficients in the two sub-periods are the same.
The results obtained with the standard export supply equations indicate that real exchange rate
variability has had a negative impact on intra-Mercosur trade flows in recent years. Therefore, they
empirically support the view that a lack of macroeconomic coordination could be an impediment for
further commercial integration in the region.                                                                                            
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Table 4.4
Mercosur: Determinants of Bilateral Exports, 1985I-1996II
Unrestricted Model Estimates
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
RER8590 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
(4.73) (4.73) (4.71) (4.71)
RER9196 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.72
(3.57) (3.57) (3.62) (3.62)
GDP8590 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36
(2.01) (2.01) (1.88) (1.88)
GDP9196 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.50
(2.68) (2.68) (2.37) (2.37)
MERC -  -0.49 -  -0.38
(-0.67) (-0.52)
VOL8590 - -  -0.11  -0.11
(-0.11) (-0.11)
VOL9196 - -  -3.30  -3.30
(-2.13) (-2.13)
Adj. R
2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
#  of obs. 552 552 552 552
Std. error 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Log-likelihood  -314.24  -314.24  -311.85  -311.85
t-statistics in parenthesis
Data sources: see Table 4.3.22
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Is there a role to be played by macroeconomic coordination in Mercosur? The evidence presented
in the paper suggests that uncoordinated macroeconomic policies have been important in putting
Mercosur under strain in the recent past. In addition, the empirical analysis of the determinants of
intra-Mercosur exports points to the existence of an inverse - albeit small - relationship between
real exchange rate variability and trade flows in the region. Given that a lower level of
international trade implies a lower degree of economic specialization, reducing the degree of real
exchange rate variability through the coordination of macroeconomic policies in the region can be
welfare improving.
The experience with the Exchange Rate Mechanism in Europe has shown that stabilizing
exchange rates through institutional arrangements is not an easy task. Even when countries are
committed to bring together a strong form of macroeconomic coordination such as a monetary
union, and set domestic policies according to that goal, international capital markets will
periodically test the determination of fixed parities and produce economic crises. In a world of
highly integrated capital markets, fixed exchange rates might be just a mirage.
11
Those difficulties are amplified in the context of Mercosur by the fact that Argentina is irrevocably
committed to a fixed parity with the U.S. dollar. In this case, any formal attempt at stabilizing
exchange rates within the region will reduce considerably the degrees of freedom for
macroeconomic policy implementation in the other countries.
12 The heterogeneity in trade
structures and trade geographic distribution increase the likelihood that exogenous shocks will
affect Mercosur countries unevenly.  In the absence of adjustment mechanisms such as free labor
mobility within the region, it is important that exchange rates retain some flexibility.
                                                       
11 As put forcefully by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
12 Most of Brazil’s trade, for example, is conducted outside Mercosur. Therefore, locking the exchange rate with
respect to the U.S. through Argentina may result in important competitiveness shifts with respect to major trade
partners such as the European Union.23
If  institutional arrangements regarding exchange rate movements are unlikely to be successful,
what form of macroeconomic coordination could be adopted in the context of Mercosur? The
paper presents evidence that real exchange rate volatility declined significantly with the
stabilization of the Argentinean and Brazilian economies in the first half of the 1990s. Therefore,
the adoption of sustainable fiscal and monetary policies in all Mercosur economies which place a
high priority on price stability will be the best form of coordination.
13 However, given the chronic
difficulties with federal control of provincial spending in Argentina, and the delays in the approval
of constitutional amendments that change the nature of the fiscal regime in Brazil, that may be a
hard task.
                                                       
13 As suggested by Abreu and Bevilaqua (1995).24
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